....نباید هیچ حرکتی در جهت قبول شاه ،تا زمانیکه نتوانسته‌ایم یک نیروی محافظ موثروا ساسی برای سفارت تهیه کنیم ، انجام دهیم ثانیا وقتی اجازه ورودشاه صادر شود باید گارد امنیتی آمریکائی اضافی برای سفارت در نظر بگیریم تا پرسنل طراز اول ( ) را از هرنوع خطر تا برطرف شدن دوره مخاطره آمیز حفظ نمائیم...

"نقل از افشاگری شماره ۲ همین کتاب"

۱

چاپ و انتشار از "دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام"

- بهـــــاء ۳۰ ریال -






GATES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 2, 1979

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Show to Tehran

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Bruce:

I was finally able to see your cable dealing with the same subject as the enclosed piece. I liked your thoughts very much and believe -- with a few details of difference -- we are in accord. My paper was prepared at Newsom's request with strict instructions not to cut anyone else in except those shown as clearing and Peter. So please protect me absolutely.

Sincerely,

Henry Precht
Director
Office of Iranian Affairs

Enclosure.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Planning for the Shah to Come to the United States

This paper outlines some concepts we should address in considering the Shah's desire to come to the United States. We believe there are three broad questions:

-- What new circumstances could justify a change in the USG position?

-- What conditions should we seek from the Shah or state prior to his arrival here?

-- What arrangements should we make for Embassy personnel to provide protection?

1. New Circumstances

The PGOI has laid out a plan for the adoption of a new constitution and election of a new government. If the plan is followed -- and that seems unlikely -- elections for an assembly of experts will be held on August 3. The assembly will conclude its work in one month; the draft constitution, which the experts will have reviewed, will be submitted to a popular referendum probably in September; and elections for a president and Majlis could take place as early as October. Because the Iranian government has placed a high priority on establishing a stronger and legitimate single authority for the country, we believe the PGOI and Khomeini will make every effort to meet this schedule. Even with the inevitable delays, there is a good chance that the process will be completed by the end of 1979.

Once it is completed, we should inform the new government that we wish to clear our decks of old issues on the agenda. One of those old issues will be the status of the Shah. We could inform the government that we have resisted intense pressures to allow him to come to the U.S. because we did not wish to complicate the PGOI's problems or our efforts to construct a new relationship. Now with the new government firmly established and accepted, it seems appropriate to admit the Shah to the U.S. The new government may not like it, but it is best to get the issue out of the way. This discussion with the new GOI should take place after it is in place some 2-3 weeks and some few days before the Shah would come here. In the meantime,

we should begin to prepare the Iranians by telling them of the intense pressures for the Shah to come here -- pressures which we are resisting despite our traditional open-door policy.

If the constitutional process does not proceed and Iranian instability seriously increases, and if there is no prospect for Iran to settle down, there may be an argument for going ahead and admitting the Shah anyway to get that inevitable step behind us, but it will be necessary first to review how dangerous the situation is.

In either of these scenarios we should aim for a positive change in our position on the Shah by January 1980. If this plan is adopted it probably would not be advisable to disseminate it beyond a close circle in the Executive Branch; perhaps a few key individuals outside might be informed so as to reduce pressures for a change. We would also have to discuss the issue with Members of Congress to indicate that we were addressing the issue and hope to resolve it successfully. This would reduce pressures which could lead, for example, to a Congressional resolution calling on the Administration to admit the Shah. However, this would increase the likelihood of leaks and our having to deal with the PGOI before we are ready.

2. Conditions

It would help substantially in explaining our position to the Iranians if the Shah were to renounce his family's claim to the throne. We believe the likelihood of his doing so is extremely remote, but the idea could be explored privately by trusted intermediaries so that if the Shah refused he would have no possibility of blaming the USG for a course he rejected.

Should the Shah refuse to renounce his claim, we should leave no doubt in the Iranian mind as to our attitude. We should make it quite clear publicly that we consider any claim to the throne by his family rendered invalid by the Iranian constitutional process, and we should make it clear privately to the Shah and his friends that we would not tolerate any counter-revolutionary acts here which might violate U.S. law, or our customary policies regarding political activities of persons admitted for temporary visits.

3. Security

We have the impression that the threat to U.S. Embassy personnel is less now than it was in the spring; presumably the threat will diminish somewhat further by the end of this year. Nevertheless, the danger of hostages being taken in Iran will persist.

We should make no move towards admitting the Shah until we have obtained and tested a new and substantially more effective guard force for the Embassy. Secondly, when the decision is made to admit the Shah, we should quietly assign additional American security guards to the Embassy to provide protection for key personnel until the danger period is considered over.

* * * * *

Before proceeding further we should have more detailed work on the legal, security and Congressional relations issues.

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp
8/1/79 - ext:20313

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Saunders
L/NEA - Mr. Small

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM

June 3, 1979

TO: NEA/RA - Robert Day
[illegible] - Rusty Graham
[illegible] - Mark Johnson
[illegible] - Joseph [illegible]
BED/CAGNE- Mickey Smith
BED/CAGNF- Don Ryan
BED/OEPE - Charles Gendreau

FROM: EB/OCA - Lynne Lambert

SUBJECT: FY 80 CAP for Iran

The attached FY 80 Commercial Action Program for Iran is submitted for your clearance. Since I shall be in Saudi Arabia on a TDY assignment from June 7 - July 9, please telephone your clearance and/or additions to Mark Johnson (tel. 632-0915). Mark will handcarry the CAP to Iran during his visit to the Post in July.

In presenting the CAP, Mark will emphasize (1) that the program we have prepared envisions an improved political climate and that conditions may not permit all the activities we have suggested; (2) that the intention of the CAP is to provide some guidelines and priorities to assist the incoming team; and (3) that the Post is free to make substantial changes since we in Washington have had little information on which to devise a program.

Thank you for your input and cooperation.

COMMERCIAL ACTION PROGRAM FOR IRAN

Section I - Overview

Iran has been one of the more important markets worldwide for U.S. goods and services. In 1978 Iran's non-military imports from the United States totaled $3.6 billion. The political upheavals of 1978 and 1979 will result in a major decline of total Iranian imports and, consequently, of U.S. exports to Iran during 1979.

The political turmoil in Iran has caused widespread labor strikes, considerable damage to plant and property, and a paralysis in the country's vital services. Petroleum exports, the chief source of foreign exchange, declined in October 1978, halted completely in late December, and did not resume until March 1979. During this period Iran lost nearly $7 billion in revenues.

The outlook for calendar 1979 is not encouraging; a serious stagflation has created critical unemployment and rising prices. The country's planners must reestablish confidence, reorder priorities and begin to lay the framework for future economic growth. In the current political climate, these will be difficult objectives to achieve.

Looking beyond this immediate period, there is hope. Iran's oil will assure the country of sizable income. At present petroleum prices, Iran should look forward to earnings of $18 - $20 billion for the next fiscal year. In addition,

foreign exchange reserves of nearly $10 billion provide a cushion. The key to any sustained growth will not be money, but effective management.

The most important U.S. commercial objective in Iran is to help American firms rebuild a strong market position and tap the opportunities which are expected to emerge in FY 80. The purpose of this document, which assumes a return to more normal political and economic conditions, is to establish a management plan and priorities toward this end. Special emphasis is given to servicing American business visitors and alert reporting on major projects. Campaigns in agribusiness and housing are projected. These sectors have been identified by the Government as high priority areas. The campaigns are not organized around Department of Commerce sponsored events, but instead emphasize development of information and contacts. As conditions change, revisions of the goals, priorities and actions may become necessary. The document establishes a framework for a dialogue on the commercial program between the Post and the Departments of State and Commerce at four month intervals. This periodic reporting requirement will provide a useful format for assessing the role which U.S. Government personnel will have in expanding U.S. exports to Iran and for planning future market promotion events.

Section III - Campaign Development

Campaign Number 1 Priority Rank 3

Campaign Title: Agribusiness

Campaign Manager: Commercial Attache and designated FSN

Objective and Rationale: Development of the agricultural sector, which received low priority by the previous regime is a major priority of the new government. Attention will be focused on improving the system which now exists, rather than on instituting [illegible] agribusiness projects. U.S. [illegible] in this field is well established, and the United States has traditionally held a strong market share in Iran's agribusiness market. Goals of this campaign are: (1) identifying the type of agricultural reform the government plans to undertake and the means of implementation, including the types and nature of government supports and subsidies; (2) reporting on major government expenditures related to agriculture, including plans for irrigation; (3) reporting on the status of local agribusiness manufacturing facilities; (4) establishing, with the cooperation of the Agricultural Attache, contacts with Ministry of Agriculture officials, local manufacturers and agents; (5) developing trade opportunities for U.S. suppliers and consultants; and (6) identifying suitable trade promotion events for Department of Commerce sponsorship in FY 82 and FY 83.

Campaign Actions:	Cumulative Milestones JAN 31	MAY 31	SEP 30
1. Make calls on government officials, private manufacturers and agents to develop information required for subsequent actions listed under this campaign.	10	20	35
2. Prepare an annotated list of government contacts for agribusiness projects.		X	
3. Report spot trade opportunities by telegram.	X	X	X
4. Prepare three periodic reports on agricultural plans and opportunities for U.S. exporters.	X	X	X
5. Prepare a report on local agricultural machinery production.		X	

Section II - Personnel Resources

FY - 1980 C.A.P.

Iran

Section III - Campaign Development

Campaign Number 1 - Agribusiness

Campaign Actions

	Cumulative Milestones		
	JAN 31	MAY 31	SEP 30
6. Prepare or update 20 WTDRs on agents for agribusiness. Reports should be prepared to insure FTI input.	7	14	20
7. Update market research or prepare a market note on agribusiness.			X
8. Identify suitable events (if any) for Commerce sponorship in FY 82 and 83.	X		X

Section III - Campaign Development

Campaign Number 2 Priority Rank 4

Campaign Title: Housing Systems and Related Equipment

Campaign Manager: Commercial Attache and designated FSN

Objective and Rationale: There is a strong demand for low income housing, which the new government has already said it will attempt to satisfy. This will probably be locally constructed or pre-fabricated housing, with emphasis on making use of local suppliers. There should be some opportunity for consulting or licensing agreements in this area as well as in providing pre-fabricated or modular housing units, but cost will be a significant factor. Sales opportunities should also exist for suppliers of air conditioning equipment and other equipment and supplies related to the housing industry. The goals of this campaign are: (1) obtaining and analyzing the sections of the new government plan relating to housing; (2) establishing contacts in the Plan Organization and in ministries supervising housing projects, as well as with private sector engineering and construction firms; (3) identifying trade opportunities for U.S. equipment and supplies exporters and locating agents for these exporters; and (4) identifying suitable trade promotion events for the Department of Commerce to sponsor in FY 82 and FY 83.

Campaign Actions:	Cumulative Milestones JAN 31	MAY 31	SEP 30
1. Make calls on government housing officials, private sector engineering and contracting firms and agents to develop information required for subsequent actions listed under this campaign.	15	30	45
2. Prepare an annotated list of government contacts in the housing sector.		X	
3. Report spot trade and project opportunities by telegram.	X	X	X

Iran

Section III - Campaign Development

Campaign Number 2 - Housing Systems and Related Equipment

Campaign Actions

	Cumulative Milestones		
	JAN 31	MAY 31	SEP 30
4. Prepare three periodic reports on government housing plans. Reports should summarize specific projects by location, type and quantity of units, project supervisor and financing, and should include information on product and equipment requirements and on local production of same.	X	X	X
5. Develop an annotated list of potential partners for U.S. engineering and contracting firms for use by the Post and the Department of Commerce.		X	
6. Prepare or update 20 WTDRs on agents for equipment and supplies related to the housing industry. Reports should be prepared to insure FTI input.	7	14	20
7. Identify suitable trade promotion events (if any) for Commerce sponsorship in FY 82 and FY 83.	X		X
8. Update research or prepare a market note on the housing sector.			X

Section IV - Other Special Post Efforts

Activity No. 1 Business Services Priority 1

Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache

Description/Justification

Maintaining the traditionally strong U.S. market position will require considerable and imaginative assistance by the Embassy staff to individual American businessmen. In addition to the normal services, priority will be given to the following: (1) performing advance work and follow up services for visiting American businessmen as requested; (2) making appointments and providing translating services whenever appropriate and possible; (3) attempting to settle trade disputes resulting from outstanding claims and other unsettled issues; (4) responding to Washington requests on behalf of American firms; and (5) preparing handout materials for visitors and correspondence. The Post's initiatives and some specific examples of services rendered should be identified in progress reports three times during the year as outlined under Section VII.

Activity No. 2 Major Projects Priority 2

Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache

Continual alert reporting on major projects is one of the most important goals of the commercial program. Two major projects sectors --agribusiness and housing-- are the subjects of campaigns, and other important areas should be identified by the Embassy and reported to Washington on a continuing basis. Goals and actions indicated under this effort include: (1) reporting major projects leads on an alert basis and following up such leads at appropriate intervals; (2) expanding contacts in major projects areas, including in the Plan Organization and ministry planning departments, and making annotated lists of contacts under heading such as Power, Housing, and so forth; (3) identifying projects whenever possible prior to the prefeasibility phase; (4) developing status reports by sector, including long and short range plans; (5) reporting changes in laws and procedures; and (6) selecting projects as candidates for 661 (Foreign Assistance Act) pre-project studies; (7) updating the major projects list prepared in 1978. Progress towards these goals should be reported in progress reports three times a year as outlined under Section VII.

Activity No. 3 Investment Protection/Facilitation Priority 5

Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache

The changed political conditions have given rise to a number of unsettled issues relating to American investments in Iran. The Embassy will inform Washington of any substantive changes in laws or procedures relating to foreign investment. It will also give prompt attention to and attempt to settle issues relating to American investment brought to its attention by Washington or by the principals concerned.

Activity No. 4 Foreign Traders Index Priority 6

Primary responsibility:

Iranian agent/distributor firms have undergone considerable changes recently, and American firms will require updated information on these changes as well as information on new potential agents. Updating WTDRs on established agents and preparing WTDRs or PIRs on new agents will require a special initiative.

Activity No. 5 Trade Opportunities Reporting Priority 7

Primary responsibility:

Establishing contacts in the private manufacturing sector and indentifying trade opportunities for American products is an important goal. At least six plant visits in addition to those conducted under the two campaigns should be carried out each period.

Activity No. 6 Trade Promotion Event Planning Priority 8

Primary responsibility: Commercial Attache

With the possible exception of the Tehran International Trade Fair, there are no Department of Commerce sponsored trade promotion events scheduled during FY 80, and there are none planned presently for FY 81. However, planning for events to be held in FY 82 and 83 will be undertaken during the year. The Post will identify, on a spot basis, themes and vehicles for future trade promotion events for consideration by Commerce in the process of developing an events program. Early identification will permit a more active program for FY 82. The Post will also prepare, upon receipt of instructions from Washington, a Best Prospects Report (no longer a CERP requirement), a preliminary CCP for FY 82 and a CAP for FY 81.

SECTION V

PERSONNEL RESOURCES ALLOCATION
(in workdays)

CONCEPT

A. BY INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITY (Some categories may be omitted) Projections	FSO/R	FSN/P	CLER.	TOTAL
1. Trade Promotion Event Supp.				
2. Mkt. Research				
a. Contract		70	25	
b. Post-conducted				
3. Major Projects/Products	60	150	30	
4. Foreign Buyer Program To be completed during consultation with the Post.				
5. Trade Opportunities Prog.	10	80	80	
6. W.T.D.R. Program	5	30	50	
7. Agent/Distributor Serv.	5	70	50	
8. FT Index	15	200	300	
9. Investment Protection/ Facilitation	30	30	5	
10. Travel Promotion				
11. Scheduled CERP Reporting				
12. Commercial Newsletter				
13. Business Services	60	160	6	
14. Other Reporting/Negotiation/ Representation				
15. Management				
16. Other E/C Activities				
17. Non-E/C Activities				
TOTAL REQUIRED/AVAILABLE 1/				

B. BY CAMPAIGNS				
1. Agriculture	20	130	30	
2. Housing	20	130	30	
3.				
4.				
TOTAL				

C. BY OTHER SPECIAL POST EFFORTS				
1. NA Nearly all are listed				
2. under A above				
3.				
TOTAL				

1/ Average annual number of workdays per employee in equals 215

Section VI - Financial Resources Schedule

Roman VI. Financial Resources Schedule (State Funds Only)

Description/Column Heading	FY 78 (ACT)	FY 79 (EST)	FY 80 (REQ)
1. Commercial Representation	Dols	Dols	Dols
2. Commercial Travel	Dols	Dols	Dols
3. Contract Services	Dols	Dols	Dols
Of Which	( )	( )	( )
WTDR Support	( )	( )	( )
Printing Newsletter	( )	( )	( )
Other (Specify)	( )	( )	( )
4. Reference Library Materials	Dols	Dols	Dols
5. Other (Specify)	Dols	Dols	Dols
Grand Totals	X,000	Y,000	Z,000

Principal E/C officer and principal administration officer have approved.

_____

_____

Section VII - Reporting

The Post is requested to submit a brief report every four months on the progress of the CAP. This report should focus on significant successes and failures of actions taken under each campaign or special effort, and an evaluation of time actually taken as against time estimated in Section V. The Post may wish to use periodic reports to propose changes in campaigns or special efforts as circumstances may dicate. Progress reports should arrive in Washington on approximately February 10, July 10 and October 10.

Drafted: LLambert:klk
5/9/79 X22363

Clearance:

State/EB/OCA:	PFrost
State/EB/OCA:	ALZucca
State/EB/OCA:	WERau
NEA/RA:	RDay
NEA/RA:	RGraham
NEA/IRN:	MJohnson
NEA/IRN:	JHarary
Commerce:	
BED/CAGNE:	MSmith
BED/CAGNE:	DRyan
BED/OEPE:	CGendreau

MMMYW ESB01HBR4GP3
OO RUQMER
DE RUEHSD #4782 2830132
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 2823572 JUL 79 ZFF4 ZDK DUE LACK OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3712
BT
S E C R E T STATE 194782

NODIS
CHEROKEE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE LAINGEN -

E.O.11652: RDS-3, 7/26/89 (TARNOFF, PETER)
FROM THE SECRETARY
TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: SHAH'S DESIRE TO RESIDE IN THE U.S.

1. WE ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO THE SHAH'S CONTINUING QUERY TO US THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS REGARDING ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE FOR HIMSELF, THE SHAHBANOU, AND HIS FAMILY IN THE U.S. (HE CAN REMAIN IN MEXICO AT LEAST THROUGH OCTOBER.) I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOUR PERSONAL AND PRIVATE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECT OF SUCH A MOVE ON THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN IRAN (ESPECIALLY THE OFFICIAL AMERICANS IN THE COMPOUND) AS WELL AS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

2. WOULD YOUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION POSED IN PARA 1 BE DIFFERENT IF (A) THE SHAH RENOUNCED HIS CLAIM AND THAT OF HIS HEIRS TO THE THRONE, OR (B) THAT HE AGREED TO FORE-SWEAR POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF ANY SORT AND THAT THIS BE CONFIRMED PUBLICLY.

3. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE KEY TO MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE SHAH'S ADMISSION WOULD BE IN BAZARGAN AND THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY IN SUCH A SITUATION TO CONTROL AND COMMAND THE SECURITY FORCES GUARDING OUR PEOPLE AND TO MINIMIZE ANY HOSTILE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE OR OUR RELATIONS.
SINCE THIS QUESTION IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR NOT SHARING THIS MESSAGE WITH ANYONE ELSE ON YOUR STAFF. PLEASE SEND YOUR REPLY NODIS/CHEROKEE, FOR THE SECRETARY. WITH BEST REGARDS.

VANCE
BT

...ostravani, Chief of Immigration,
...irabad Airport

With the compliments of the
American Embassy

جناب سرهنگ خسروانی
ریاست محترم پلیس فرودگاه مهرآباد

...Bigdari, Chief of Foreign
Residents Bureau

With the compliments of the
American Embassy

سپهبار سرتیپ بیگدلی
ریاست محترم اداره اتباع بیگانگان

...saghafi, Deputy Chief, Foreign
...nts Bureau

With the compliments of the
American Embassy

جناب سرهنگ ثقفی
معاونت محترم اداره اتباع بیگا...

Col. Khoshkhoo, Deputy Chief,
Foreign Residents Bureau

With the compliments of the
American Embassy

...ب سرهنگ خوشخو
...اونت محترم اداره اتباع بیگانگان

« کارتهای ارسالی برای افراد نامبرده »

Col. Mahboobi, Deputy Chief
Foreign Residents Bureau

With the compliments of the
American Embassy

...سرهنگ محبوبی
...ت محترم اداره اتباع بیگانگان

SECRET - SCI 6 546 0025

B

ORGANIZATION

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

(PASDARAN-E-ENGILAB)

IMAM KHOMEINI — 3 Security Guards.

CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE — 12 Personnel.

REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS — 30,000 Personnel.

POLITICAL WING

MILITARY WING

ECONOMIC WING
(Budget Allotmen
200 Million Ria

COMMANDER — Ayatullah Lahoti.

CHIEF OF STAFF — Ayatullah Rafsanjani and Gholam Ali Afrouz.

ENTRAL COMMAND
SALTANATABAD,
TEHRAN

PROVINCIAL COMMAND

OTHER COMMAND FOR BORDER CHECK POSTS AND KEY AREAS

TRAINING CENTRE AND TRAINING UNITS ALIABAD

4000 Personnel) (20000 Personnel) (3000 Personnel) (3000 Personnel

ESSION

To act as eyes and ears of the Islamic Revolution and work as special tas force of Imam Khomeini to crush any counter revolutionary activities with the Government or any Political Upsurge against Islamic Government.

To work as Parallel Force to Armed Forces so as to maintain parity and prevent any coup attempt by them.

Revolutionary Guard Corps to take over the task of Imam Committee Volunte Force once it is dissolved.

Revolutionary Guards to work as counter insurgency force inside the count and also assist other law enforcing agencies to carryout their duties smoo ly and to remain always on call to move any direction at short notice.

SECRET

- 2 -

e. Revolutionary Guard Corps to work as hard core sentinel of the Islamic Revolution indoctrinated with patriotic zeal and Islamic sacrificing spirit.

Other Informations

a. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran-E- Enqilab) will have 30000 strong force which will be completed in phases. At present this organisation is having ten to fifteen thousand forces all over Iran. As per plan every city of 5000 population is supposed to have a unit of 200 strong revolutionary guards.

b. All the 21 Provincial Capital Cities will have 1000 strong guards each under the local revolution committees. This may vary from Province to Province depending on the Political situation of the Provinces.

c. 20 Units of 200 Strong Guards each have been already raised in Tehran having HQ at Sultanatabad, to maintain security in Theran City with special emphasis at night.

d. Revolutionary Guards will not be under the administrative or technical control of any Ministry of the Government, but it will be under the direct control of Imam Khomeini through the Central Islamic Revolution Committee.

e. Presently there is no age limit for Pasdaran. They can be of any age between 16 years to 60 years.

f. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps so far has been raised 42 Units in Iran.

g. NO PLO Trained Instructor has been employed in training camp Aliabad. Instructors are all from the Army.

November 4, 1979

Memorandum for the File

Subject: Iranian Investment Copoportation

Mr. Iradj Kepmejad, Managing Director, Pars Investment Corp., called today about a visa.

Mr. K. estimates that the Iranian industrial sector, outside of oil, is functioning at about 20 percent of capacity. He expects increasing bankfuptcies of companies over the next few months.

Pars Investment is a subsidiary of the old consortium, formed to invest locally as a favor to the government. He has about 300 million rials which he would like to transfer abroad, capital which has not been invested. Central Bank permission is pending. An embarrassment since some of the companies in which Pars holds interests are hard up for cash, near bankfuptcy. No dividends have been repatriated for about a year.

Mr. K. will consult American oil company stockholders. Expects that the consortium will meet in New York shortly to discuss company affairs.

Mr. K. has been harassed by committees; called in and held three days; interrogated blindfolded by unknowledgable types. Later by an educated man who decided that he had not done wrong by sending routine commercial reports to London.

E/C:ROB

7/12 CRU Did it go to Frankfurt??

NOISIR

LBL

[illegible] ISAAC IFT 17[illegible]

[illegible] 2810 193513

[illegible] CSC RTV

[illegible]Z JUL 79

[illegible] STATE WASHDC

[illegible] EMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 3[illegible]

[illegible]

C O N F I D E N T I A L [illegible] 170613

E.O. 12065 GDS, 7/11/85 (GREENE, KYLES)

TAGS: OVIS, IR

SUBJECT: NIV APPLICANT: ADMIRAL HABAL HABIBOLLAHI

REF: (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. HABIBOLLAHI, COMMANDER OF IRANIAN NAVY DURING LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS OF SHAH'S REGIME, HAS BEEN HELD UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN IRAN SINCE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. VERY STRONGLY [illegible] IRANIAN PASSPORT WITH DIPLOMATIC VISA AS IS [illegible] HIS WIFE.

2. [illegible] ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN ACTIVE [illegible] IS [illegible] ISSUE TO SUCH OFFICERS [illegible] IN ANY CASE, IF OUR RECORDS [illegible] HABIBOLLAHI [illegible] HAS CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT TO [illegible] RETURN TO IRAN.

3. [illegible] HABIBOLLAHI [illegible] AND SHOULD APPLY FOR [illegible] WITH HIS CURRENT PASSPORT.

4. IF [illegible] IN VISA-EXEMPTION [illegible] VISA, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

[illegible]

US MILITARY MISSIONS AND ACTIVITES

MAAG is the principal US military presence in Iran. Its is to promote co petence of Iranian military forces, n Iran's ability to resist aggression and to further US s in Iran.

y Lend Lease Mission was established in Iran in 1941. This rganized as "ARMISH" (United States Military Mission with Army) in 1943. In 1947, the basic agreement between the ment (USG) and the Government of Iran (GOI) which provided timing US military advisor assistance to the Army, Navy, and ce was signed. In 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance to the avy, and Air Force was signed by the USG and GOI. This agree- hich was separate and distinct from the ARMISH agreement, pro- r US military administration of the Military Aid Program (MAP). In 1962, the first grant aid was delivered to the Armed Forces. In 1958, ARMISH and MAAG were consolidated. In e Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Credit program was started. ss of the program resulted in the phase-out of the Grant Aid in 1972.

AAG is commanded by a Major General, and his principal advisory is to provide daily advice to the Chief of the Supreme Commander's other high ranking Iranian military commanders, as well as al audience with His Imperial Majesty to discuss Iran's e and future level of

of the ARMISH-MAAG provides advice to the Supreme Commander's the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, (the military staff of the ran). Each of the major Iranian staff directorates, such as , Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Plans and Programs, and agement has one or more advisors assigned, usually in the olonel. ARMISH-MAAG is fully committed to meeting the multiple f the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (IIA) modernization program. inception of the FMS Program in 1972, Iran has ordered approximately services valued in excess of ten-billion dollars. Current activities are focused on the acquisition of this equipment and g of IIA personnel in the use of the equipment. To aid the G in accomplishing the job, the GOI has purchased the services vided Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT's). All costs with this program are borne by the Government of Iran (GOI). ese have fluctuated based on GOI needs and supportive capa- the USG. The TAFT's operate under the guidance and direction ice Sections and for the most part are geographically dis- ughout Iran, collocated with the IIA forces they advise. In

[illegible] developed are valid; the proof of [illegible] evident throughout the [illegible] forces. For example, the Imperial [illegible] Air Force (IIAF) growth in technical competence has allowed us to increasingly move away from technical assistance toward management tance where we can concentrate on the development and training of t middle managers and future leadership. The Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF) are beginning to show definite progress in such areas maintenance and supply procedures. The Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) smallest service and last to get started, is working well on fleet pansion and the achievement of operational readiness. Overall, we seeing IIA personnel beginning to perform tasks on a routine basis would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible a short ti Despite this progress, ARMISH-MAAG continues to stress and seek i management attention on such key areas as utilization of TAFT reso and counterpart relationships. An advisory section is collocated headquarters of the Imperial Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy. A Brigadier General heads the Army and Air Force Sections, and the C of the Navy Section is a Rear Admiral. Field teams are located in Kermanshah, Shiraz, Tabriz, Abadan, Ahwaz, Mashed-E-Soleman, Ker Gazvin, Mashad, Rezaiyeh, Boroujerd and Isfahan with the principal quarters and schools.

Effective 1 July 1977 ARMISH-MAAG Staff Sections were redesignated the following Directorate organization. (Organization chart at S

Directorate of Personnel Support Management (ARPSM) previously A

Serves as the principal advisor to Chief, ARMISH-MAAG on matters to U.S. Support Mission Policies in Iran and performs special act training to the Command Support Mission. Acts as Coordination/ Agency for all U.S. Personnel Policy Matters as relates to the and keeps Chief, ARMISH-MAAG appraised of Health, Morale and W grams. Prepares annual Joint Manpower Program for the ARMISH-M functions as central point of contact for Technical Assistance (TAFT) to include Program Development. Serves as principal coor agency for new or revised support policy matters as required. Serv ARMISH-MAAG principal staff element for Coordination/Control of S Assistance Funded Support Activities--United States Support Activity United States Army Communications Command-Iran and Medical Activity Provides Acting Inspector General for Command.

Directorate of Studies, Plans, and Operations (ARSPO) previously Dir of Plans, Policies and Programs.

Conducts systems analysis and prepares related studies regarding pro IIA Acquisitions of U.S. Defense Systems. Develops a comprehensive ARMISH-MAAG position regarding proposed weapon acquisitions based o Iranian needs and absorptive capacity, the U.S. capability to deli

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued)

28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued)

88. COMMENTS. Particularly comment upon the officer's overall leadership ability, personal traits not listed on the reverse side, and estimated or actual performance in combat. Include comments pertaining to unique skills and distinctions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an asterisk (*) indicates adversity and supporting comments are required.

COMMENTS: CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH HAS BEEN THE NAVAL ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN IRAN DURING THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE REVOLUTION. DURING THE SEVERAL MONTHS WHEN THIS REVOLUTION WAS DEVELOPING, HE ACCURATELY REPORTED THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TRANSPIRING IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. HIS AMIABILITY AND KNACK IN QUICKLY DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS RESULTED IN RELIABLE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. IN THE MATTER OF ONLY A FEW WEEKS HE ESTABLISHED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH MANY OTHER FOREIGN ATTACHES AND ESTABLISHED A MOST BENEFICIAL CROSSTALK. HE OBSERVED AND CRITICALLY REPORTED UPON THE TENSIONS AND FISSURES WHICH WERE BUILDING UP IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. NUMEROUS STRESSFUL SITUATIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED BY CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH DURING THE SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HIS RESPONSE TO NEARLY ALL THESE SITUATIONS WHICH INCLUDED ATTEMPTED ASSASINATION WERE EXEMPLIFIED BY CALMNESS, DECISIVENESS AND RATIONAL THINKING. WHEN THE LOCAL SITUATION DETERIORATED TO THE POINT THAT AMERICANS HAD TO BE EVACUATED, CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION PHASES OF THIS MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT. HIS EXPERTISE, INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIVENESS INSURED THE SAFE AND TIMELY MOVEMENT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS AND OTHER FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HIS UNTIRING AND UNSELFISH EFFORTS AIDED IMMEASURABLY IN A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION. SEVERAL TIMES CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH ACTED AS DEFENSE ATTACHE DURING THE ABSENCE OF THE DATT. IN THIS CAPACITY HE READILY ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFECTIVELY MANAGED THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH IS AN EXCELLENT OFFICER WHO IS REGARDED AS A TRUE PROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY COMPETENT ATTACHE BY HIS COUNTERPARTS. HIS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR WAS NORMALLY EXEMPLIFIED BY HIGH STANDARDS OF BEARING, CONDUCT AND COURTESY WHICH ENHANCED THE IMAGE OF THIS NAVAL OFFICER. HIS DIRECT AND EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY MISSION IN TEHRAN ADDED GREATLY TO THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE.

سنڈب ٢

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973 — 486 - 666

BUPERS USE ONLY

P1611-1

BUPERS USE ONLY

REPORT ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	2. GRADE	3. DESIG.	4. SSN
HOLLINGWORTH, ROY MILTON	CAPT	1310	460-40-9504

5. ACDUTRA/TEMAC	6. UIC	7. SHIP/STATION	8. DATE REPORTED
		USDAO IRAN	78 JUN 30

OCCASION FOR REPORT: 9. PERIODIC ☐ | 10. DETACHMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR ☐ | 11. DETACHMENT OF OFFICER ☐

PERIOD OF REPORT: 12. FROM: | 13. TO:

TYPE OF REPORT: [X] 14. REGULAR | 15. CONCURRENT ☐ | 16. SPECIAL ☐ | 17. OPS CDR ☐

BASIS FOR OBSERVATION: [X] 18. CLOSE | 19. FREQUENT ☐ | 20. INFREQUENT ☐

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY)

22. DAYS OF COMBAT: N

23. REPORTING SENIOR (LAST NAME, FI, MI)	24. TITLE	25. GRADE	26. DESIG.	27. SSN
SCHAEFER, T E	DATT	COL	USAF	112-24-1183

28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY)

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE (TYPE IN OCR CODE LETTER FROM WORK SHEET)

29. GOAL SETTING & ACHIEVEMENT	30. SUBORDINATE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT	31. WORKING RELATIONS	32. EQUIP & MATERIAL MANAGE.	33. NAVY ORGAN. SUPPORT
A	A	A	A	A

A

34. RESPONSE IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS	35. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY	36. SPEAKING ABILITY	37. WRITING ABILITY
B	A	A	A

WARFARE SPECIALTY SKILLS (FROM OCR WORK SHEET)

38. SEAMANSHIP	39. AIRMANSHIP	40. WATCH STANDING	41.	42.	43.
N	A	N			

44. SUBSPECIALTY CODE	REQUIRED BY BILLET: 45. YES ☐	46. NO ☐	UTILIZATION: 47. FREQUENT ☐	48. INFREQUENT ☐	49. NONE ☐	(WORK SHEET CODE) 50. PERFORMANCE
N						

MISSION CONTRIBUTION	NOT OBS.	TOP 1%	TOP 5%	TOP 10%	TOP 30%	TYPICALLY EFFECTIVE OFFICER 50%	TYPICALLY EFFECTIVE OFFICER 50%	BOTTOM 30%	BOTTOM MARG.	BOTTOM UNSAT*
51. EVALUATION				X						
52. SUMMARY				1						

TREND OF PERFORMANCE: [X] 53. FIRST REPORT | 54. CONSISTENT ☐ | 55. IMPROVING ☐ | 56. DECLINING* ☐

B

DESIRABILITY (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET)

57. COMMAND	58. OPERATIONAL	59. STAFF	60. JOINT/OSD	61. FOREIGN SHORE
C	A	A	A	A

RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION: 62. EARLY ☐ | [X] 63. REGULAR | 64. NO* ☐

RANKING FOR EARLY PROMOTION: 65. NUMBER RECOMMENDED | 66. RANKING

PERSONAL TRAITS (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET)

67. JUDGMENT	68. IMAGINATION	69. ANALYTIC ABILITY	70. PERSONAL BEHAVIOR	71. FORCEFULNESS	72. MILITARY BEARING
A	A	A	B	A	A

C

73. ☐	74. ☐	75. ☐	76. ☐

WEAKNESSES DISCUSSED? [X] 77. NONE NOTED | 78. YES ☐ | 79. NO* ☐

STATEMENT: 80. NOT DESIRED N | 81. ATTACHED ☐

D

82. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER EVALUATED (IAW BUPERS INST. 1611-12-SERIES). "I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS REPORT AND HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF MY PERFORMANCE."

E

83. DATE FORWARDED	84. ☐

85. SIGNATURE OF REPORTING SENIOR: Thomas E. Schaefer

F

86. DATE FORWARDED

87. SIGNATURE OF REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR ON CONCURRENT AND CONCURRENT/SPECIAL REPORT

NAVPERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 — WORK SHEET (0-73

DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

* Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY.

"DRAFT"

٣

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued)

28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued)

88. COMMENTS. Particularly comment upon the officer's overall leadership ability, personal traits not listed on the reverse side, and estimated or actual performance in combat. Include comments pertaining to unique skills and distinctions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an asterisk (*) indicates adversity and supporting comments are required.

COMMENTS: CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH WAS DEEN THE NAVAL ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (Continued)

28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (Continued)

88. COMMENTS. Particularly comment upon the officer's overall leadership ability, personal traits not listed on the reverse side, and estimated or actual performance in combat. Include comments pertaining to unique skills and distinctions that may be important to career development and future assignment. A mark in boxes with an asterisk (*) indicates adversity and supporting comments are required.

COMMENTS: CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH HAS BEEN THE NAVAL ATTACHE AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN IRAN DURING THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE REVOLUTION. DURING TH SEVERAL MONTHS WHEN THIS REVOLUTION WAS DEVELOPING, HE ACCURATELY REPORTED THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TRANSPIRING IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. HIS AMIABILITY AND KNACK IN QUICKLY DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS RESULTED IN RELIABLE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. IN THE MATTER OF ONLY A FEW WEEKS HE ESTABLISHED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH MANY OTHER FOREIGN ATTACHES AND ESTABLISHE A MOST BENEFICIAL CROSSTALK. HE OBSERVED AND CRITICALLY REPORTED UPON THE TENSIONS AND FISSURES WHICH WERE BUILDING UP IN THE IRANIAN NAVY. NUMEROUS STRESSFUL SITUATIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED BY CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH DURING THE SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HIS RESPONSE TO NEARLY ALL THESE SITUATIONS, WHICH INCLUDED ATTEMPTED ASSASINATION, WERE EXEMPLIFIED WITH CALMNESS, DECISIVENESS AND RATIONAL THINKING. WHEN THE LOCAL SITUATI DETERIORATED TO THE POINT THAT AMERICANS HAD TO BE EVACUATED, CAPTAIN HOLL WORTH PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION PHASES OF THIS MAJOR EVACUATION EFFORT. HIS EXPERTISE, INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIVE NESS INSURED THE SAFE AND TIMELY MOVEMENT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS A OTHER FOREIGNERS OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HIS UNTIRING AND UNSELFISH EFFORTS AIDED IMMEASURABLY IN A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION. SEVERAL TIMES CAPTA HOLLINGWORTH ACTED AS DEFENSE ATTACHE DURING THE ABSENCE OF THE DATT. IN THIS CAPACITY HE READILY ACCEPTED THE RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFECTIVELY MANAG THE DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE. CAPTAIN HOLLINGWORTH IS AN EXCELLENT OFFICER WHO IS REGARDED AS A TRUE PROFESSIONAL AND HIGHLY COMPETENT ATTACHE BY HI COUNTERPARTS. HIS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR WAS NORMALLY EXEMPLIFIED BY HIGH STANDARDS OF BEARING, CONDUCT AND COURTESY WHICH ENHANCED THE IMAGE OF THIS NAVAL OFFICER. HIS DIRECT AND EXPERT SUPPORT TO THE MILITARY MISSIO IN TEHRAN ADDED GREATLY TO THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENSE ATTAC OFFICE.

U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
APO NEW YORK 09205

REVIEWED BY:
REVIEWED & SIGNED BY:
J. O. TUTTLE
RADM, U.S. NAVY
ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR
FOR PLANS AND POLICY

REPORT ON THE FITNESS OF OFFICERS

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	2. GRADE	3. DESIG.	4. SSN
HOLLINGSWORTH, ROY MILTON	CAPT	1310	460-40-9504

5. ADCUTRA/ TEMAC	6. UIC	7. SHIP/STATION	8. DATE REPORTED
	62250	USDAO IRAN	78JUN30

OCCASION FOR REPORT			PERIOD OF REPORT	
9. PERIODIC	10. DETACHMENT OF REPORTING SENIOR	X 11. DETACHMENT OF OFFICER	12. FROM 78OCT01	13. TO 79MAY31

TYPE OF REPORT					BASIS FOR OBSERVATION		
X 14. REGULAR	15. CONCURRENT	16. SPECIAL	17. OPS CDR		X 18. CLOSE	19. FREQUENT	20 INFREQUENT

21. EMPLOYMENT OF COMMAND (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY): THIS IS A JOINT STAFF ASSIGNMENT AT DOD LEVEL — 22. DAYS OF COMBAT: N

23. REPORTING SENIOR (LAST NAME, FI, MI)	24. TITLE	25. GRADE	26. DESIG.	27. SSN
SCHAEFER, T E	DATT	COL	USAF	112-24-1183

28. DUTIES ASSIGNED (CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE OF RECORD COPY): ALUSNA-NAVAL ATTACHE-B

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE (TYPE IN OCR CODE LETTER FROM WORK SHEET)

29. GOAL SETTING & ACHIEVEMENT	30. SUBORDINATE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT	31. WORKING RELATIONS	32. EQUIP & MATERIAL MANAGE.	33. NAVY ORGAN. SUPPORT
A	A	A	A	A

A	34. RESPONSE IN STRESSFUL SITUATIONS	35. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY	36. SPEAKING ABILITY	37. WRITING ABILITY
	B	A	A	A

WARFARE SPECIALTY SKILLS (FROM OCR WORK SHEET)

38. SEAMANSHIP	39. AIRMANSHIP	40. WATCH STANDING	41.	42.	43.
A	A	N			

44. SUBSPECIALTY CODE	REQUIRED BY BILLET		UTILIZATION			(WORK SHEET CODE)
	45. YES	46. NO	47. FREQUENT	48. INFREQUENT	49. NONE	50. PERFORMANCE N

MISSION CONTRIBUTION	NOT OBS.	HIGH			MID			LOW		
									MARG.	UNSAT*
51. EVALUATION				X						
52. SUMMARY	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

TREND OF PERFORMANCE

X 53. FIRST REPORT	54. CONSISTENT	55. IMPROVING	56. DECLINING*

B	DESIRABILITY (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET)				
	57. COMMAND B	58. OPERATIONAL A	59. STAFF A	60. JOINT/ OSD A	61. FOREIGN SHORE A

RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION			RANKING FOR EARLY PROMOTION	
62. EARLY	X 63. REGULAR	64. NO*	65. NUMBER RECOMMENDED	66. RANKING

PERSONAL TRAITS (TYPE IN OCR CODE FROM WORK SHEET)

67. JUDGMENT	68. IMAGINATION	69. ANALYTIC ABILITY	70. PERSONAL BEHAVIOR	71. FORCEFULNESS	72. MILITARY BEARING
A	A	A	B	A	A

C	73.	74.	75.	76.

WEAKNESSES DISCUSSED?			STATEMENT	
X 77. NONE NOTED	78. YES	79. NO*	80 NOT DESIRED N	81. ATTACHED

D — 82. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER EVALUATED: (IAW BUPERS INST. 1611-12-SERIES). "I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS REPORT, HAVE BEEN APPRISED OF MY PERFORMANCE AND RIGHT TO MAKE A STATEMENT." COPY PROVIDED

E — 83. DATE FORWARDED: 79SEP24 | 84. | 85. SIGNATURE OF REPORTING SENIOR

F — 86. DATE FORWARDED | 87. SIGNATURE OF REGULAR REPORTING SENIOR ON CONCURRENT AND CONCURRENT/SPECIAL REPORT

NAVPERS 1611/1 (REV. 5-77) S/N 0106-LF-016-1100 — REPORTING SENIOR'S COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 — 240-818/015

86. DATE FORWARDED

NAVPERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 — WORK SHEET (0-73)

DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

* Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY.

"DRAFT"

ATTN: COL SCHAEFER. YOUR COPY OF FITREP ON CAPT. HOLLINGWORTH.

NAVPERS 1611/1 (REV. 9-72) S/N 0106-078-3113 WORK SHEET (0-7

DETACH WORK SHEET BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

* Comments are required. Enter comments in Section 88 on RECORD and OFFICER copies. DO NOT ATTACH CONTINUATION PAGES TO OCR COPY.

"DRAFT"

16 JUN 79 02 11Z

NNNNVV ESB028BRN458
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEKJCS #4204 1662140
ZY SSSSS
P 152135Z JUN 79
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD:ISA//
TO CARMISH MAAG TEHRAN IR
BT
S E C R E T 1143
FROM: DSAA-TS (1398/79)
SUBJECT: DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE FOR IRAN (U)
1. (S) CURRENT SUBJECT GUIDANCE DATED 12 MAR 1979 IS AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE: DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO IRAN (U)
(U) OBJECTIVE
TO PROMULGATE NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY COMMITTEE (NDPC) GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (GOI).
(C) BACKGROUND
(C) A. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TURMOIL WHICH IS EVIDENT IN IRAN AT THIS TIME AND WHICH IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEAR TERM, PLACES IN QUESTION THE ABILITY OF THE GOI TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT UNITED STATES CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.
(C) B. IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT UNITED STATES CLASSIFIED MILITARY

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T
INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY RELEASED TO THE GOI HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO COMPROMISE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CANNOT AFFIRM THE EXTENT OF SUCH COMPROMISE AT THIS TIME.
(C) C. NOTWITHSTANDING, MEASURES MUST BE ADOPTED TO ENSURE THAT DISCLOSURES CULMINATING FROM PRIOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS ARE HELD TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND NO NEW INITIATIVES ARE UNDERTAKEN REGARDING IRAN WHICH MAY INVOLVE THE DISCLOSURE OF MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH, IF COMPROMISED, WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
(U) GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE
(C) A. NEW INITIATIVES SHALL NOT BE UNDERTAKEN WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO RESULT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION OR MATERIEL TO THE GOI WITHOUT SPECIFIC NDPC APPROVAL.
(S) B. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, THE GOI'S ELIGIBILITY LEVELS AS REFLECTED IN ANNEX A, NDP-1, FOR CATEGORY 1 (ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES), CATEGORY 2 (MILITARY MATERIEL AND MUNITIONS), CATEGORY 4 (PRODUCTION INFORMATION), CATEGORY 5 (COMBINED MILITARY OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND READINESS) AND CATEGORY 6 (MILITARY INTELLIGENCE) ARE SUSPENDED. THIS SUSPEN-

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T
SION WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS: (1) THE NDPC CAN DETERMINE THAT THE GOI CAN ADEQUATELY PROTECT U.S. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION AND, (2) THE GOI FORMALLY REAFFIRMS THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATE/IRANIAN GENERAL SECURITY OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT, DATED JUNE 6, 1974. EXCEPT AS NOTED IN C., BELOW, WHILE THE SUSPENSION IS IN EFFECT, ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF U.S. CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION AT ANY LEVEL WILL BE HANDLED AS AN EXCEPTION TO POLICY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY NDP-1. THIS SUSPENSION IS APPLICABLE TO BOTH NEW INITIATIVES AND TO THE DELIVERY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIEL AND DOCUMENTATION UNDER PRIOR COMMITMENTS.

(C) C. THIS SUSPENSION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE ORAL/VISUAL DISCLOSURE OF CMI PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED BY DESIGNATED DISCLOSURE AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT IRANIAN PERSONNEL TO COMPLETE ONGOING, PROGRAMMED AND SCHEDULED TRAINING WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF MATERIAL PROVIDED TO THE GOI UNDER PREVIOUSLY APPROVED FMS OR GRANT AID PROGRAMS, UNLESS DESIGNATED DISCLOSURE AUTHORITIES DETERMINE SUCH DISCLOSURE WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

(C) D. THESE GUIDELINES ALSO APPLY TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

PAGE 4 RUEKJCS 4204 S E C R E T
DEVELOPED IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH MAY CONCEIVABLY REACH IRAN THROUGH THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO). END QUOTE.
2. (U) A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT IS ALSO BEING MAILED TO YOU.
3. (C) THE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE IS NOT RELEASABLE TO THE GOI.
DECL 13 JUN 85.
BT
#4204

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 11414

PE RUEHTE #1414 302 **
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291322Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO USICA WASHDC
BT
UNCLAS TEHRAN 11414

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
CHRGE: USICA 10/29/79
APPRV: USICA:PAO:JGRAVE
DRFTD: USICA:PAO:JGRAVE
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ICA-4 CHARGE POL CRU

USICA

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJ: HEGIRA CELEBRATION IN U.S.

1. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TODAY ORDERED THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE PGOI TO COME UP WITH "REVOLUTIONARY PLANS TO MARK THE GREAT AND AUSPICIOUS OCCASION" OF THE BEGINNING OF THE 15 CENTURY ON NOVEMBER 21 (HEGIRA).

2. POST URGENTLY NEEDS INFORMATION ON U.S. PLANS TO CELEBRATE HEGIRA WITH VIEW TO TYING THEM INTO IRANIAN CELEBRATION.

3. IF U.S. PLANS TO CELEBRATE HEGIRA INCLUDE INVITING IRANIAN PARTICIPANTS, POST NEEDS DETAILS ASAP. GRANES
BT
#1414

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED TEHRAN 11414

* U.S. Government Printing Office: 1978—204-930

2

-YA-

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET

11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

SECRET TEHRAN 00367

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, IR
SUBJ: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN IRAN
(A)
REF: /77 STATE 291277; (B) 77 STATE 295486

1. WE NOTE WITH APPRECIATION DEPARTMENT'S RECOGNITION THAT AS STATEMENTS OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED/~~NXXH~~ FIXED OR IMMUTABLE. WE HAVE EXAMINED WITH CARE THOSE SET FORTH IN REFTEL B. IN LARGE MEASURE WE BELIEVE THEY ARE REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE AND ADDRESS OUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND INTERESTS IN IRAN. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MODIFIED AND EXTENDED THIS STATEMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SLIGHTLY ALTERED PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT OUR CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OUGHT TO BE. THERE FOLLOWS A FULL RESTATEMENT IN THE FORMAT USED IN REFTEL B.

2. BEGIN TEXT. I. A SUSTAINED POLITICAL/ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BUILT UPON TRUST CONFIDENCE, AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

DCM2
AMB 2
POL 2
ECON2
PM
USIS
CONS
OR2
DAO
MAAG2
CRU
POUCH
SHIR
TABR
ISFA2

20/reh

TED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
DCM:JCMIKLOS/sw	1/10/77	1102	DCM:JCMiklos/sw

ANCES:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152
(Formerly FS-413)
January 19
Dept. of S

-- MAINTAIN AND REINFORCE THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED WITH THE SHAH.

-- ASSESS THE RANGE OF EMBASSY CONTACTS IN THE IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY AND INITIATE STEPS TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH THOSE FORCES AND GROUPS WHICH ARE EVOLVING INTO IMPORTANT CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AS IRAN MODERNIZES. THIS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY RECENT EASING OF SOME GOVERNMENT STRICTURES ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY RECOGNIZING THAT SOME RISKS MAY BE INVOLVED IN CERTAIN CASES REQUIRING THAT WE PROCEED SELECTIVELY AND PRUDENTLY.

-- ENCOURAGE PRIMIN AMOUZEGAR AND HIS CABINET TO REFLECT ON IRAN'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOALS AND TO PLAN A SPECIFIC AND INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC MOMENTUM AS OIL REVENUES INEVITABLY DIMINISH. IN THIS RESPECT ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT IRANIAN INITIATIVES TO SEEK OUTSIDE EXPERT ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE FROM THE IBRD AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCES.

-- ENGAGE FULL RANGE OF USIS CAPABILITIES IN KEEPING IRANIAN DECISIONMAKERS AND OPINION MOLDERS INFORMED OF US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES AFFECTING IRANIAN INTERESTS AND IRANIAN-US RELATIONS.

II. AN ENHANCED US-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN NON-MILITARY FIELDS.

-YY-

-- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF A RELIABLE PETROLEUM SUPPLY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CLOSEST ALLIES AND THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE PRICING POLICY. EXPLAIN U.S. ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, AND THE NEED OF THE WORLD ECONOMY FOR OIL AT BEARABLE PRICES.

-- FACILITATE AN INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES' SHARE OF THE MARKET IN IRAN AND BE PREPARED TO USE THE WEIGHT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE IN SUPPORT AT A MINIMUM, OF NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY AMERICAN FIRMS TO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN IRAN.

-- ASSESS HOW WE CAN MAKE THE US-IRAN JOINT COMMISSION MORE EFFECTIVE, INCLUDING HOW TO INVOLVE THE US PRIVATE SECTOR MORE FULLY.

-- PURSUE WITH DR. ETEMAD AND HIS ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATES FORMULATION OF FINAL TEXT OF US-IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS PRESIDENT'S NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES.

-- MAINTAIN US INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING PRIVILEGES IN IRAN, AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE QUID PRO QUO LIAISON SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO THESE PRIVILEGES. CAREFULLY WEIGH ANY PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL PRIVILEGES TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT ENDANGER EXISTING ASSETS.

-- SEEK TO ENGAGE IRAN MORE FULLY IN REGIONAL NARCOTICS EFFORTS AIMED AT REDUCING NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND REDUCING ILLICIT NARCOTICS

TRAFFIC INTO AND THROUGH IRAN.

-- WORK WITH GOI MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO E IMPROVE PROCEDURES IN THE EVALUATION AND PROCESSING OF IRANIANS SEEKING AN EDUCATION IN THE US.

-- EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IRANIAN STUDENTS PLANNING TO STUDY IN THE US TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE ORIENTATION, COUNSELING, AND ENGLISH INSTRUCTION PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE.

-- CONTINUE TO PRESS IRAN FOR FULL PAYMENT OF THE DELINQUENT SURPLUS PROPERTY DEBT.

III. CAREFULLY COORDINATED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM.

-- MAINTAIN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE SHAH AND HIS PRINCIPAL MILITARY ADVISORS ON HIS MILITARY NEEDS WITH THE AIM OF AVERTING NONESSENTIAL MILITARY SALES REQUESTS.

-- CAREFULLY SUPERVISE EXISTING AND ANTICIPATED FOREIGN MILITARY SALE CASES.

-- CLOSELY MONITOR ACTIVITIES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF US ARMS MANUFACTURERS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE OBSERVING THE NEW REGULATIONS ON SALES PROMOTION AND SEEK WAYS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF US DEFENSE-RELATED CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAN TO THEIR ESSENTIAL NUMBERS.

-- MONITOR OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE IRANIAN DEFENSE NEEDS ARE MET WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT ARMS TRANSFER GUIDELINES.

REEXAMINE US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP TO ENSURE ~~ZAT~~ THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC LAW 95-92.

-- ENCOURAGE GOI TO ACCEPT INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED MILITARY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND INTERNAL STAFFING TECHNIQUES WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING DEPENDENCE ON US MILITARY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE.

-- MAINTAIN US OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO IRANIAN [illegible]S FOR NAVAL SHIPS.

IV. [illegible]NANCE OF IRAN'S BALANCED POSTURE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS.

-- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUATION OF IRAN'S BALANCED APPROACH TO ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS AND ITS SUPPORT FOR OUR MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- ENCOURAGE THE MAINTENANCE OF A POSITIVE IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, INCLUDING AN OIL SUPPLY LINK.

-- MAINTAIN IRAN'S OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN REPROCESSING.

-- SUPPORT IRAN'S COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, AND OTHER ARABIAN PENINSULA STATES ON PERSIAN GULF SECURITY, KEEPING INFORMED ON RELEVANT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ ~~אאאאא~~ AND IRAN'S OTHER REGIONAL NEIGHBORS.

-- ENCOURAGE A CONTINUATION OF RESPONSIBLE IRANIAN COOPERATION WITH AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND INDIA IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERES.

-- ENCOURAGE IRANIAN SUPPORT OF OUR PRINCIPLE POLICIES IN AFRICA.

V. IMPROVEMENT IN IRAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE.

-- REVIEW WITH THE SHAH AND OTHER RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS, ON APPROPRIATE OCCASION, US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES, FOCUSING ON IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS (WHICH IS ATTAINABLE) AS OPPOSED TO PUSHING FOR CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (WHICH MAY SMACK OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE), NOTING THE IMPACT AN UNFAVORABLE IRANIAN PUBLIC IMAGE ON THIS ISSUE MIGHT HAVE ON IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE.

SULLIVAN

افشای امپریالیسم